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Abstract. The current consensus among comparative political scientists postulates that diverse 
democracies redistribute less than do homogeneous ones. However, whereas homogeneous 
democracies do redistribute more on average, diverse democracies exhibit high variation in 
redistributive outcomes. Why does ascriptive heterogeneity stifle redistribution in some cases but 
not in others? In this article, it is argued that diversity undermines redistributive outcomes when 
identity groups differ more starkly in their income levels. More importantly, under these conditions, 
the policy outcomes are not uniform: rather than general cutbacks, richer groups selectively under-
prioritise benefits and access for poorer, minority-heavy groups while keeping their own 
redistributive interests protected. The result is not simply less redistribution aggregately, but a more 
exclusionary and regressive welfare state that prioritises the special needs of better-off identity 
groups. Empirical support is found in these hypotheses using macro-comparative panel data on 
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multiple redistributive aspects in 22 developed democracies in the years 1980–2011. The article thus 
outlines a conditional and more nuanced relationship between diversity and redistributive outcomes 
than commonly assumed, as well as several broader lessons for research of identity politics and 
social policy. 
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Introduction 
 
How do ascriptive identity cleavages – ethnicity, race, religion and language – shape 
redistributive policies in developed democracies? The growing attention to this question by 
comparative social scientists, and particularly the influential work by Alesina and Glaeser 
(2004), cemented the notion that diverse countries redistribute less than homogeneous 
ones. Yet, although widely accepted, this straightforward theoretical prediction has mixed 
empirical support, particularly in developed democracies (Mau & Burkhardt 2009; 
Pontusson 2006; Taylor-Gooby 2005). Moreover, newer research on individual-level 
preferences finds that the negative relationship between diversity and popular support for 
redistribution depends upon additional demographic and socioeconomic factors (e.g., Alt & 
Iversen 2017; Burgoon 2014; Dahlberg et al. 2012; Finseraas 2012). 
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Recent descriptive data confirm this empirical tension. Figure 1 plots three different 
measures of redistribution levels against an index of ascriptive identity fractionalisation1 in 
19–22 OECD countries. Figure 1A displays public social spending in 2011 as a share of gross 
domestic product (GDP), Figure 1B presents the relative reduction in income inequality by 
tax and transfers in 2011, and Figure 1.C showcases the combined generosity of key social 
security programs in 2010 (Scruggs 2014). The fitted lines show negative correlations 
between ascriptive diversity and all three aspects of redistribution. On average, as the 
literature expects, homogeneous countries spend more than heterogeneous ones on social 
programmes, reduce a greater share of inequality and offer more generous social security 
entitlements. However, the plots also reveal a heteroskedastic pattern: whereas 
homogeneous countries tend to cluster together more closely, heterogeneous ones vary 
more broadly by all three redistributive measures. This tendency is illustrated with the 
matching box-and-whisker diagrams, which split the sample in half and plot the variation 
within each subgroup. Thus, the accepted notion that diversity undermines redistribution 
seems correct but insufficient: higher heterogeneity in ascriptive identities influences 
redistributive outcomes, but not in all cases. Why is this so? 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] [AQ2] 
 
This article addresses this issue by discussing the combined role played by ascriptive 
identities and class in shaping de facto redistributive outcomes. Building upon previous 
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research on ethnic inequality and redistributive preferences, it is argued that diverse 
democracies redistribute less in practice when some ascriptive identity groups are richer 
than others and have lower willingness to support the latter. Extending the discussion to 
policy outcomes, I hypothesise that the redistributive implications are not uniform. As 
stronger identity groups seek to minimise intergroup redistribution, the negative effect 
concentrates primarily in programmes targeting poorer groups and on the latter’s access to 
social benefits. At the same time, richer groups protect broader redistributive programmes 
that serve their members and make them more exclusionary. Diversity with higher 
intergroup inequality, therefore, leads to more regressive and less inclusive welfare state 
with more differentiation between the needs it addresses. 
I find support in these hypotheses using macro-comparative panel data on multiple 
redistributive aspects in 22 developed democracies in the years 1980–2011. Specifically, I 
show that the negative relationship between ascriptive diversity and redistributive 
outcomes is mediated by the level of income differences between identity groups. More 
importantly, I find differential outcomes among various redistributive aspects. When 
identity and income cleavages reinforce one another, higher diversity curbs welfare 
programmes that target the needs of poorer groups (unemployment, social assistance and 
public healthcare), but does not affect programmes addressing cross-class risks such as old 
age and incapacity. Under these conditions, furthermore, key social security programmes 
cover fewer recipients, even as their generosity per (fully covered) recipient remains high. 
These combined findings imply higher benefit differentiation between strong and weak 
groups rather than crude cutbacks across the board. Therein lies the answer to the empirical 
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puzzle: heterogeneous countries tend to redistribute less than homogeneous ones on 
average, but this tendency varies by the reinforcement of identity and class divisions and by 
specific programmes. I conclude the article with some broader implications for the study of 
identity politics and social policy. 
 
Existing research on diversity, intergroup inequality and redistribution 
 
Social scientists have long established that ascriptive identities – ethnicity, race, religion and 
language – are particularly potent politically given their inherent, indivisible and relatively 
rigid nature (Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Rae & Taylor 1970), their central role in in-group 
coordination (Bates 1983; Fearon & Laitin 1996) and their mobilisation by political actors  
(Chandra 2004; Posner 2004). Different studies have demonstrated that ascriptive identity 
cleavages influence economic development and democratisation (Easterly & Levine 1997; 
Montalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005), intergroup conflict (Fearon & Laitin 2003; Wilkinson 
2008), public goods provision (Alesina et al. 1999; Habyarimana et al. 2007), party systems 
(Clark & Golder 2006; Ordeshook & Shvetsova 1994) and voter behaviour (Chandra 2004; 
Huber 2012).  
In the same vein, more attention has been given in recent years to the redistributive 
implications of ascriptive diversity. The accepted wisdom arising from this literature 
suggests that diverse societies redistribute less income than do homogeneous ones. Higher 
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ascriptive heterogeneity, the logic goes, exacerbates collective action problems and 
fractures class solidarity, leading in turn to more limited welfare policies. Empirical support 
in this argument draws predominantly from the United States, where the salient racial 
divide is linked repeatedly with reduced public services and social programmes at all levels 
of government (Alesina et al. 1999; Quadagno 1994; Ribar & Wilhelm 1999; Skocpol 1992). 
Alesina and Glaeser (2004) offer the most comprehensive comparative presentation of this 
claim, maintaining that higher racial and ethnolinguistic diversity explains much of the 
historic gap between the American and European welfare states (see also Desmet et al. 
2009; Sanderson 2004). They further argue that ascriptive cleavages precede and explain 
the emergence of class politics and electoral institutions, the primary drivers of welfare 
policy according to previous research. The notion that ascriptive heterogeneity weakens 
redistribution has since become a common premise in comparative politics research. 
Although highly influential, this argument has been challenged both theoretically 
and empirically (for a comprehensive critique, see Pontusson 2006). Taylor-Gooby (2005) 
and Mau and Burkhardt (2009), for example, argue that the negative correlation loses its 
statistical power when the sample is limited to Western countries and with a more careful 
consideration of other economic, political and demographic differences. Furthermore, 
newer studies find that various individual and social factors condition personal preferences 
for redistribution in diverse societies (Steele 2016). In particular, researchers found that 
support in redistribution decreases most strongly when minorities are poorer or perceived 
as such. These studies argue that higher inequality between identity groups increases their 
perceived social and cultural distance, leading in turn to increased in-group identification 
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(Higashijima & Houle 2017), decreased solidarity (Lupu & Pontusson 2011) and stronger 
stigmatisation of poor minorities (Gilens 1995; Kinder & Sears 1981; Nelson 1999). 
Intergroup inequality also exacerbates the social threat posed to richer identity groups by 
generous redistribution, which could mobilise poorer identity groups into the former’s 
communities and undermine their relative social status (Corneo & Grüner 2002; Shayo 
2009). Finally, intergroup income inequality sets apart each group’s occupational risks and, 
accordingly, their redistributive interests (Alt & Iversen 2017). 
Similar mechanisms of intergroup inequality have been linked empirically with 
higher chances of ethnic voting (Huber & Suryanarayan 2016) and civil wars (Gubler & 
Selway 2012; Østby 2008; Cederman et al. 2011) and with weaker democratic stability 
(Houle 2015), economic development (Alesina et al. 2016) and public goods provision 
(Baldwin & Huber 2010), particularly in developing regions. However, the consequences for 
redistributive outcomes in democracies remains understudied. The majority of work done 
on the latter emphasise two often-overlapping implications, both of which paint only part 
of the picture (e.g., Alt & Iversen 2017; Brady & Finnigan 2014; Burgoon 2014; Finseraas 
2012; Stichnoth 2012). First, many studies focus on individual preferences as the primary 
outcome of interest. Yet, public preferences on redistribution are measured broadly and 
tell us little about actual policy outcomes. Second, there is increased focus on recent 
immigration and its mostly negative effect on redistributive preferences and policies. 
Recent immigrant inflows are a growingly important factor in Western democracies. 
Nevertheless, immigration is one of several causes for ascriptive heterogeneity, and as 
such is insufficient for a fuller understanding of the latter. New immigrants integrate 
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slowly, do not automatically constitute a coherent political constituency, and face unique 
barriers to full political and economic rights, parliamentary representation and access to 
state services (Bird et al. 2011; Dancygier 2010; Dancygier et al. 2015; Michon & 
Vermeulen 2013). Accordingly, while there are signs of a gradual decline in social spending 
due to sustained immigration (Soroka et al. 2016), the majority of empirical findings 
concentrate on immigrant-specific policies such as tighter immigration rules, revised 
integration policies and stricter immigrant access to welfare programmes (Hemerijck et al. 
2013; Koning & Banting 2013; Sainsbury 2012). Existing theoretical and empirical accounts 
of the relationship between ascriptive diversity writ large and redistributive outcomes 
remain incomplete. I turn to address this gap next. 
Theoretical propositions: From preferences to redistributive outcomes 
 
My theoretical propositions on policy outcomes build upon and proceed where the 
previous discussions stop. Following the literature on ascriptive diversity and 
redistribution, I expect that heterogeneous democracies would face stronger pressures 
against broad redistribution than homogeneous ones. But, following the mechanisms 
outlined in the literature on intergroup inequality and preferences, I expect these forces to 
vary by each country’s alignment of identity and class. As socioeconomic inequality 
between identity groups grow, so would they drift apart, identify more strongly with their 
in-group members, and seek to minimise intergroup redistribution. 
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These two established premises raise the question of endogeneity in ascriptive 
cleavages. An influential body of work shows that ascriptive identities can form and 
strengthen due to economic development, state borders, electoral institutions and violent 
conflicts (e.g., Chandra 2004; Laitin 2007; Posner 2004; Sambanis & Shayo 2013 [AQ7]). 
The discussion in this article adopts a milder position on this issue. On the one hand, I 
assume that within every country the primary social cleavages have largely been formed 
long ago – a common claim with regard to contemporary developed democracies (Lipset & 
Rokkan 1967). Therefore, I do not explore long-term processes of identity formation within 
each country. On the other hand, when comparing different countries, the relative political 
importance of similar identities can differ based on their (slow-changing) cleavage 
reinforcement with class. The primary comparison in this article is thus between different 
social structures rather than within them. 
Even as intergroup inequality decreases the motivation for redistribution, the shift 
from general preferences to policy implications is not straightforward.2 Redistributive 
policy making is not a dichotomous decision between more or less government 
involvement. To see why, it is useful to consider the two primary roles of the welfare state. 
First, welfare policies reduce the inequalities created by market forces through income 
transfer from rich to poor. Second, welfare policies provide social insurance against various 
socioeconomic risks. Different risks, however, vary in their level of threat to different 
classes. Some risks, like age-related complications or chronic disability, pose a notable 
threat to all classes; both rich and poor grow old and may suffer from enduring health 
problems. Moreover, both aging and chronic disability constitute a particular threat to 
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high-level workers as they undermine one’s occupational capacity and labour market 
advantage. By contrast, other risks, like sustained unemployment, material deprivation or 
sudden short-term healthcare costs, threaten lower classes more severely. These risks are 
accommodated more easily by the middle and higher classes, who hold more stable 
professions, better access to private insurance, and higher disposable income and savings. 
The latter risks, therefore, induce grater interclass redistribution than the former. 
Following this logic, when some ascriptive identity groups are richer than others, their 
increased in-group bias should undermine only programmes focused on income 
redistribution and on lower-class risks. Programmes that protect against shared risks, by 
contrast, should remain protected as they also benefit middle- and high-class groups. 
Underinvestment in programmes serving the poor is not the only channel through 
which richer identity groups can minimise intergroup redistribution without hurting their 
own interests. Another path is to decrease poorer groups’ access to programmes that 
address shared risks. In particular, lower classes can be excluded effectively based on their 
status in the labour market, where many developed economies experience growing 
segmentation between different tiers of workers. As research on this topic shows, there is 
increasing divergence of interests between so-called ‘insiders’ – workers with relatively 
secure jobs and strong political capital – and ‘outsiders’ – low-skilled and vulnerable 
workers, often minorities and immigrants (Emmenegger et al. 2012; Iversen & Soskice 
2015; Rueda 2005). Richer groups, therefore, can also entrench harsher access criteria that 
exclude poorer workers from full labour market protection that they themselves enjoy. 
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The theoretical intuition is illustrated in Figure 2, which plots several hypothetical 
income distributions in a society comprising two ascriptive identity groups. In all cases, 
income assumes a standard left-skewed distribution, with a higher concentration of 
citizens at the middle and lower classes. Panel A plots a perfectly cross-cutting cleavage 
structure, such that the two identity groups distribute similarly across all income levels. In 
this case, previous research implies that in-group bias may be weaker, thus moderating its 
negative effect on redistribution. More importantly, even if each group cares only for the 
interests of its in-group members, they both share the same risks and benefit similarly from 
redistributive policies. Accordingly, cutbacks to any programme type will equally hurt both 
groups. This is not the case when identity and income divisions reinforce one another, as 
panel B demonstrates. Here, we may expect that the reinforcement of identity and class 
will increase in-group identification and exacerbate intergroup and interclass distance. 
Equally important, in this scenario members of the rich identity group benefit nothing from 
welfare policies targeting the needs of the poor. At the same time, their interest in 
programmes covering middle and higher class needs remains firm. Only in case B, but not 
in case A, we should expect more limited redistributive policies, and specifically ones 
serving the poor. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] [AQ3] 
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Two nontrivial scenarios, portrayed in panels C and D, reinforce this logic. Panel C 
considers high intergroup income differences in a relatively homogeneous society. If the 
poor minority is very small in size, intergroup inequality does not crowd out the dominant 
group from the lower class. Instead, the majority benefits from all types of welfare policies 
regardless of the small minority’s position. This example, therefore, underscores that 
intergroup inequality is insufficient in itself. The key theoretical mechanism requires both 
higher heterogeneity and stronger reinforcement of identity and class. 
Panel D examines a scenario where identity and class cleavages reinforce one 
another, but now the minority is strictly rich rather than poor. Prima facie, we should 
expect an opposite outcome compared to panel B, as the poorer majority group could 
establish a lower/middle class coalition that will force the rich minority to redistribute 
income broadly. This argument, however, is weak for two reasons. First, because of the 
left-skewed nature of income distributions, for a minority to be strictly richer than the 
lower and middle classes it must be quite small in size. Panel D, for example, has the same 
majority-to-minority proportion as in panel C, only with a different spread. Here, too, 
society is actually quite homogeneous. As it will grow more diverse, the minority group’s 
members will fill the ranks of the middle class and fracture the interclass coalition against 
the rich. Second, even if the rich are a relative minority, a growing literature finds that 
policy making tends to react more strongly to the interests of the rich (Bartels 2015; Gilens 
2012; Peters & Ensink 2015), implying that a (sufficiently sizable) rich minority would be 
politically strong even without an absolute majority.3  
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In sum, I expect that higher ascriptive diversity, when reinforced by broader 
intergroup class differences, should dampen redistributive outcomes nonuniformly, 
concentrating primarily on (1) welfare programmes targeting the needs of the poor, and 
(2) universal access to programmes providing labour market protection. 
Data and empirical strategy 
 
I test these theoretical hypotheses using a series of models estimating how the combination 
of ascriptive diversity and intergroup income differences correlates with multiple aspects of 
welfare policy in developed democracies. I use cross-sectional time-series data form the 
years 1980–2011 for 22 countries: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. 
The panel data are unbalanced – that is, not all countries have available data for all years 
and models. 
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Variables of interest 
 
Dependent variables 
 
I examine the primary outcome of interest – redistribution– from multiple perspectives. 
The  first and simplest aspect is aggregate redistribution levels, measured by two 
complementary variables: (1) public social spending as a share of gross domestic product 
(GDP), using data from the OECD Social Expenditure Database (SOCX); and (2) relative 
reduction in income inequality before and after taxes and transfers, measured as the share 
of change in the Gini coefficient of household income, using data from the Luxembourg 
Income Survey (LIS; Wang & Caminada 2011).4 The use of two separate measures of 
redistribution adds robustness to the findings and harnesses each measure’s respective 
strengths. Social spending data are available on an annual basis and for more countries, are 
better standardised and measure investment in in-kind services in addition to cash 
transfers. Income inequality reduction, meanwhile, captures de facto policy implications 
and is not as sensitive to economic shocks or recipient numbers as the spending data. All 
else equal, I expect that a combination of higher heterogeneity and cleavage 
reinforcement with class will decrease both measures similarly. 
The second aspect unpacks redistribution to subcomponents, again using both 
public social spending and inequality reduction data. I group disaggregated data from both 
sources into several categories based on their covered risks:5 (1) age-related benefits, 
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consisting of old-age and survivor transfers and services; (2) incapacity and sickness 
benefits, consisting of sick pay compensation, occupational injury transfers and disability 
benefits; (3) unemployment benefits, consisting of unemployment compensation and 
active-labour programmes; (4) assistance benefits, consisting of income maintenance, 
housing assistance, family and child allowances, and similar in-kind benefits; and (5) public 
social spending on universal healthcare services.6 All else equal, I expect that a 
combination of higher heterogeneity and wider intergroup income differences will dampen 
only unemployment, social assistance and public healthcare programmes, which benefit 
lower classes disproportionally, whereas old-age and incapacity programmes should not be 
affected. 
The third aspect of redistribution involves inclusiveness in labour market protection 
programmes. I use data from the Comparative Welfare Entitlement Project (CWED2; 
Scruggs et al. 2014) on two key social security programmes: unemployment and sick pay 
insurance.7 For each programme, I compare two measures: coverage, measured as the 
share of labour force insured under each programme; and wage replacement rate, 
calculated against the mean of an average single worker’s wage and an average four-
person family’s wage. All else equal, I expect that a combination of higher heterogeneity 
and wider intergroup income differences will decrease only the level of programme 
coverage (i.e., access to programmes), not wage replacement rates (i.e., generosity for 
those who remain fully included). 
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Independent variables 
 
My hypotheses mark two explanatory factors: heterogeneity in ascriptive identities, and the 
reinforcement of identity and class cleavages. In line with the current literature, I measure 
ascriptive heterogeneity using one minus the Herfindahl index, which estimates the level of 
social fractionalisation.8 There has been a significant improvement in the quantity and 
quality of ascriptive fractionalisation indices in recent years. Nevertheless, these indices 
have two notable problems. First, the multitude of indices raises the risk of post hoc cherry-
picking. Second, available indices calculate separate scores for different ascriptive identity 
dimensions, typically by race, ethnicity, religion and/or language. These different types of 
identities, however, all share an alleged common genetic, historic or spiritual decent, have 
relatively rigid and visible criteria, and foster effective social coordination (Chandra 2006; 
Hale 2004; Haller & Eder 2015; Laitin 2007). Therefore, this imposed separation makes it 
difficult to compare similar processes across equally divided countries differing only in the 
type of active identities that developed there historically (Wimmer 2008). We thus need a 
common measure to compare the implications of ascriptive intergroup tensions in such 
cases as the United States (race), Belgium (language), Ireland (religion) or Israel (ethnicity).  
One way to deal with this problem is to calculate heterogeneity scores based only on 
each country’s politically salient identities (Wimmer et al. 2009). This approach, however, is 
problematic for my hypotheses, which imply that the political importance of ascriptive 
identities may vary by its interplay with class. An examination of only politically dominant 
identities risks obscuring the mediating role of intergroup inequality. To test this 
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relationship, we need a broader measure of heterogeneity in all types of ascriptive 
identities. 
To deal with these problems, I calculate an Ascriptive Identity Fractionalisation (AIF) 
index that integrates multiple sources and identity types into a single country-score. The 
combination of several sources increases the measure’s reliability. I draw from four 
databases that rely different types of primary sources: (1) three indices of ethnic, linguistic 
and religious fractionalisation, based on encyclopedic sources (Alesina et al. 2003); (2) the 
Ethnic Power Relations’ index of ethnic fractionalisation in politically relevant groups, 
based on expert surveys (EPR; Wimmer et al. 2009); (3) the Cross-cutting Cleavages 
dataset’s two indices of ethnic and religious fractionalisation, based on survey data (Selway 
2011); and (4) an index of linguistic fractionalisation, based on a genealogical linguistic tree 
analysis (Desmet et al. 2012).  I assign equal weight to each identity type: I first average 
across all indices of a particular dimension, creating separate fractionalisation scores for 
ethnicity, religion and language, and then average again across all three identity types to 
produce a single AIF score per country.9 Figure 3 summarises the index’s structure. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE] [AQ4] 
 
Due to data limitations, the AIF index is time-invariant – that is, it assigns a fixed 
score per country for the entire sample period. Although this is not ideal, ascriptive 
heterogeneity is considered quite stable in the literature, particularly over relatively short 
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periods of 30 years or less (Alesina et al. 2003: 161). To corroborate this assumption, I 
recreated the AIF index using data from Patsiurko et al. (2012), who calculate separate 
ethnic, religious and linguistic fractionalisation scores for 18 of the countries in my sample 
in 1985 and then in 2000. The strong bivariate correlation between the two periods (r = 
0.93, p < 0.000) implies high stability over time.10 
The second explanatory variable of interest is the reinforcement of ascriptive 
identity and income, measured using the Cross-cutting Cleavages dataset created by 
Selway (2011), who aggregates data from various public opinion surveys to evaluate the 
distribution of group members in one cleavage across another. Two cleavages are cross-
cutting if the distribution of members along categories in the first cleavage is independent 
of their distribution in the second. Conversely, two cleavages reinforce one another if their 
member distributions correlate with one another. Similar to the AIF measure, I average 
across two ascriptive identity scores in Selway’s data: cross-cuttingness of income and 
ethnicity, and cross-cuttingness of income and religion.11 To align with my theoretical 
hypotheses, I invert the composite score to measure cleavage reinforcement. 
Like the AIF index, the cleavage reinforcement scores are time-invariant due to data 
limitations. This constraint should not pose a fundamental problem, as reinforcement 
levels are expected to be both exogenous to redistribution and stable during the sample 
period. For my purposes, the measure’s reliance on correlation of distributions across 
categories is preferable to indices of intergroup income inequality (e.g., Baldwin & Huber 
2010; Houle 2015), which rely on mean incomes that may be endogenous to redistributive 
policies. Moreover, the surveys used to calculate the reinforcement scores ask responders 
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about their relative income bracket. Redistributive policies lessen inequality – that is, the 
gap between income levels and not their position relative to one another – and hence 
should not affect the latter’s distribution.12 Several diagnostic and robustness tests, 
elaborated upon later and in the Online Appendix, corroborate both the exogeneity and 
stability of the cleavage reinforcement measure.13 
In addition to the two primary variables of interest, I also control for several other 
explanatory factors associated in the literature with redistributive outcomes. My control 
variables include institutional features (a combined index of institutional veto points), 
political power balance (cabinet partisanship and union centrality) and socioeconomic 
factors (unemployment rate, labour force participation, female participation in the labour 
force, the share of elderly population, logged trade openness and logged GDP per capita). 
Table A1 in the Appendix summarises the definitions, sources and expected effects of all 
control variables. The descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent and control 
variables are presented in the Online Appendix. 
 
Model specification 
 
My empirical strategy consists of a series of single-equation error-correction models (ECM) 
using pooled regression analysis (Beck 1991; Davidson et al. 1978; De Boef & Keele 2008). 
Due to indications of panel-specific heteroskedasticity, the estimation employs panel-
corrected standard errors (PCSE; Beck & Katz 1995, 2011). The ECM specification is 
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particularly appropriate for redistribution data, known for their slow change over time and 
strong serial autocorrelation. This specification assumes that the outcome is in an 
equilibrium relationship with its explanatory variables, but that this relative stability can be 
disturbed by short-term shocks followed by a correction back to the long-term trend as the 
system adjusts. These dynamics are estimated by regressing changes in the dependent 
variable on the lagged values of all independent variables (long-term equilibrium 
relationship), the first difference of all dependent variables (short-term disturbances to the 
equilibrium) and the lagged value of the independent variable (the correction back to 
equilibrium).14 Since my primary explanatory variables are time-invariant, I include them 
outside the error-correction dynamics. Their stable values are interpreted as projecting a 
structural, long-term influence on dynamic patterns of equilibrium and disturbances. 
Formally, I estimate the following model: 
 
                 (               )                            (1) 
 
where β1 estimates the short-term effect of a vector of control variables X on changes in 
redistribution level R, β2 estimates the long-term effect of a one-unit increase in vector X, γ 
is the error-correction term capturing the speed of adjustment back to equilibrium and β3 
estimates the structural effect of my time-invariant explanatory variables. I interact the two 
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main explanatory variables to test their hypothesised conditionality (Brambor et al. 2006; 
Kam & Franzese 2007).15  
Several alternative model specifications, including a simpler cross-sectional model 
with a between-effects estimator, support the same theoretical and substantive 
conclusions. I use the ECM as the baseline specification because it both controls for 
additional variables (unlike a simple cross-sectional model with fewer degrees of freedom) 
and captures intricate political dynamics by separating stable long-term effects from short-
term disturbances (unlike a simpler Lagged Dependent Variable (LDV) model). I elaborate 
more on these alternative specifications later and in the Online Appendix. 
 
Findings 
 
Initial premise: Diversity, income and intergroup relations 
 
Before I turn to my primary analyses of redistributive outcomes, I begin with a simple 
corroboration of my main theoretical premise: that the combination of ascriptive diversity 
and higher reinforcement with income undermines group relations and interclass solidarity. 
To test this assumption, I use data from two cross-sectional surveys with relevant 
questions.16 To examine group relations, I estimate responses to the following question 
from round 7 (i.e., 2014) of the European Social Survey (ESS): ‘When thinking about contact 
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with different race or ethnic group, in general how bad or good is it?’ The answers range on 
a ten-point scale from ‘extremely bad’ to ‘extremely good’. To examine interclass relations I 
estimate responses to the following question from the 2009 Social Inequality IV module of 
the International Social Survey Programme (ISSP): ‘In all countries, there are differences or 
even conflicts between different social groups. In your opinion, in [Respondent's country] 
how much conflict is there between the working class and the middle class?’ The answers 
range on a four-point scale from ‘very strong conflicts’ to ‘there are no conflicts’. I estimate 
responses to these questions using a multilevel linear regression with random intercepts by 
country. The models control for individual-level effects of age, sex, education, religiosity and 
occupational skill level.17 
The results, presented in Table 1, confirm my theoretical assumptions. Holding 
individual attributes equal, intergroup contact is experienced more negatively (model 1) and 
the poor and middle class seem in deeper conflict (model 2) in countries where ascriptive 
diversity is reinforced by higher intergroup income differences. With the core theoretical 
assumptions supported, we can now turn to examine the primary findings on redistributive 
outcomes. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
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Diversity, income and aggregate redistribution 
 
The first set of tests, presented in Table 2, evaluate the prediction that cleavage 
reinforcement mediates the relationship between ascriptive diversity on redistributive 
outcomes, at this point still in aggregate terms. As a point of reference, models 3 and 5 test 
the direct effect of ascriptive diversity on these outcomes, as proposed by Alesina and 
Glaeser (2004). Contrary to their argument, I find no direct effect of ascriptive 
heterogeneity on either social spending or inequality reduction.18 Models 4 and 6, by 
contrast, support my conditional prediction. The negative interaction coefficients indicate 
that as the cleavage reinforcement of identity and income grows, ascriptive diversity has 
an increasingly negative effect on changes in both government spending and inequality 
reduction. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
Figure 4 illustrates these patterns visually. The two graphs plot the estimated 
marginal effect of a hypothetical change from complete homogeneity to complete 
heterogeneity under different levels of cleavage reinforcement with income. As expected, 
higher diversity has a negative marginal effect on redistribution, which grows as the two 
cleavages overlap more closely. Furthermore, the negative influence is significant only past 
some minimal threshold of cleavage reinforcement. Interestingly, when identity and income 
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cross-cut one another, the spending model estimates that higher heterogeneity will slightly 
expand redistribution levels. This outcome may be explained theoretically by a race to the 
top between rival identity groups. When all groups have strong identities and in-group bias, 
but similar shares of poor members, increased in-group identification may create 
simultaneous motivations for higher redistribution to poor in-group peers, increasing overall 
redistribution as a result. A process in this spirit has been occurring in Belgium since the 
late-1990s, as both the federal and the regional Flemish governments simultaneously 
expanded overlapping redistributive programmes. This process is fueled to a large degree by 
Flemish motivation to establish a separate redistributive system and by federal 
counteraction to fortify the national system (Béland & Lecours 2008; Cantillon 2011). This 
empirical pattern should not be overstated, however, as it is both small in size and does not 
repeat in inequality reduction. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE] [AQ5] 
 
Most, although not all, control variables perform as expected in models 4 and 6. The 
relationship with political factors is mixed. Whereas Christian-democratic cabinets tend to 
increase redistribution both in the short and the long terms, left-leaning cabinets do not 
display the expected positive correlation. Interestingly, central wage bargaining loses its 
statistically significant effect once the interaction is added, implying that its direct effect on 
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redistribution is eclipsed not by diversity in itself but by the latter’s juxtaposition with 
income. The index of institutional veto points does not have a notable effect as well.  
Among socioeconomic factors, higher unemployment shows a complex pattern: it 
increases redistribution in the short term, reflecting higher immediate demand, but also 
decreases social spending over the long run, likely due to a shrinking economy and tax base. 
Higher labour force participation decreases social spending both immediately and over the 
long run, although its effect on inequality reduction is insignificant, while higher female 
participation in the labour force expectedly increases both measures of redistribution. An 
older population increases social spending in the long term, although it improves inequality 
reduction only in the short term. More trade openness, associated with opposing pressures 
on the welfare state, indeed displays a mixed influence: it correlates with short-term 
reduction in social spending, but also with long-term increase in inequality reduction. GDP 
growth has the expected positive effect on changes in social spending, for which it acts as 
the denominator, but not on inequality reduction. Finally, the negative and statistically 
significant error-correction terms in all models corroborate the sense of a stable long-term 
relationship that corrects itself following short-term shocks. 
Programme type, coverage and replacement rates 
 
My hypotheses, nonetheless, expects that diversity and reinforcement with income would 
exert negative pressures only on social policies serving poorer identity groups. Table 3 
presents similar estimations for disaggregated spending and inequality reduction. The 
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results, reported in truncated form for ease of presentation, support my hypotheses: the 
negative interactive effect of heterogeneity and cleavage reinforcement is statistically 
significant only for unemployment, social assistance and public healthcare spending, the 
three programme types that serve lower-class needs most unevenly. By contrast, 
redistribution for old-age and for incapacity, two risks shared by higher classes, remain 
unaffected by diversity irrespective of its reinforcement levels with income. Importantly, 
this pattern repeats in both government spending and inequality reduction. 
 
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The negative relationship with unemployment benefits is particularly interesting. 
Poorer workers face a larger risk of sustained unemployment, yet middle-class employees 
are not fully immune to it. Earlier, I suggested that better-off groups can protect 
themselves against labour market risks while minimising intergroup redistribution by 
restricting the access of poor minorities to social security programmes. Table 4, which 
estimates changes in levels of coverage and replacement rates, supports this expectation.19 
Social insurance for both unemployment and sick pay shows the same pattern: the 
interaction of heterogeneity and cleavage reinforcement has a negative effect on the share 
of covered workers, but not on the compensation granted to those who are fully included. 
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[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
 
To corroborate that these models reflect exclusion of weaker workers, I also 
examine whether they predict other labour market policies benefiting strictly stronger 
workers. I do so by estimating whether the same factors correlate with the OECD’s 
Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index for individual and collective dismissals of 
regular contracts, considered a measure of pro-insiders policy in segmented labour 
markets (Rueda 2005). Since the EPL scores hardly change over time, I ran a cross-sectional 
model with a between-effects estimator including all the dependent variables from models 
16–19. The estimation, reported in detail in the Online Appendix, finds a positive and 
statistically significant interaction coefficient for diversity and reinforcement. In other 
words, supporting my theory, diverse democracies with higher intergroup inequality tend 
to protect better-off workers more strongly in other legislation as well. 
The positive interaction effects for replacement rate in Table 4 display a curious 
trade-off, illustrated visually by the marginal effect plots in Figure 5: higher ascriptive 
heterogeneity decreases benefit generosity when identity and income cross-cut one 
another. The reason may be simple budget constraints: to avoid over-spending, wider 
coverage (under cross-cutting cleavages) may force governments to transfer less per 
recipient. This interpretation implies that ascriptive diversity and class influence coverage 
directly and replacement rates indirectly. When identity and income reinforce one another 
more strongly, higher heterogeneity leads to narrower coverage and, therefore, to weaker 
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budgetary pressures to cut benefit generosity. When identity and class cut across one 
another, however, higher heterogeneity motivates all groups to increase inclusion of their 
members, hence forcing them to reduce benefit generosity to keep the system sustainable. 
 
[INSERT FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE] [AQ6] 
 
To support the interpretation of a trade-off between coverage and generosity, I 
reran the same models with the multiplication of coverage and replacement rates as the 
outcome of interest. If the two indeed trade off, we should find no significant change in 
their combined product regardless of diversity and cleavage structure. The estimation, 
elaborated upon in the Online Appendix, indeed produces the expected null finding. 
 
Robustness checks 
 
Several diagnostic tests and alternative specifications, all elaborated upon in the Online 
Appendix, validate the robustness of my findings. First, I cross-validate all models by 
dropping each country at a time to verify that their fit is not driven by influential cases (Beck 
& Katz 2011). I then rerun all models while dropping in turn cases that may stand out for 
theoretical reasons: Norway, due to its irregular rise in GDP, the denominator of social 
spending; Greece, due to its partial cleavage reinforcement score; the United States, due to 
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the common critique that its unique racial history and welfare policies drive previous 
findings; and Israel, due to its extreme cleavage reinforcement score. The findings remain 
substantively unchanged in all cases. 
Second, for models using annual data, I verify that the findings are not driven by 
the yearly structure of the panel. I do so by replacing the values of all (time-variant) 
independent variables with their moving averages for the previous three years (i.e., the 
mean value of lags 1–3) and rerun all models. The results remain substantively unchanged. 
Third, I test the model’s specification sensitivity by splitting the sample by the 
median values of each time-varying variable in turn, estimating the primary coefficients on 
each subsample, and averaging their estimates (Athey et al. 2017; Athey & Imbens 2015).20 
The mean estimates and their standard deviation support the robustness of my 
specification. 
Fourth, I test my hypotheses using several alternative model specifications. 
Specifically, I use a simple cross-sectional between-effects estimator that averages variable 
values for the entire sample period, a standard LDV model and a minimal LDV model with 
fewer control variables. Despite their lesser fit to the data, all models corroborate my 
conclusions. 
Finally, I rule out the possibility that the results are driven by an endogenous 
relationship between redistribution and cleavage reinforcement. As discussed previously, 
there are both theoretical and empirical reasons that alleviate this concern. Nonetheless, 
to dispel remaining doubts, I rerun all models with an alternative measure of ethnic 
  
 
This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved. 
 
inequality created by Alesina et al. (2016). The ethnic inequality measure maps nighttime 
satellite imagery of light density, reflecting economic development, onto historic 
homelands of different ethnic groups within each country. It then calculates a Gini 
coefficient of inequality in light density between these subnational regions.21 This 
alternative measure is strongly exogenous to redistributive policies, but has two significant 
weaknesses: first, it refers only to ethnicity; and, second, the focus on historic homelands 
excludes ascriptive cleavages formed through non-geographic processes such as migration, 
slave trade or religious conversion. Even so, it correlates reasonably well with my cleavage 
reinforcement measure (r = 0.67, p < 0.001). The results, reported in more detail in the 
Online Appendix, corroborate my findings. 
 
Conclusion 
This article has explored when and how ascriptive diversity shapes redistribution in 
developed democracies. The theoretical and empirical analysis suggests that higher 
diversity matters for redistributive outcomes, but, contrary to the common assumption, it 
does not act independently or homogeneously. Instead, extending recent findings on 
redistributive preferences, I demonstrate that welfare outcomes too are affected by the 
combination of diversity and class. Specifically, using data from the past few decades, I find 
that deeper ascriptive diversity dampens redistributive outcomes when income differences 
between identity groups are sufficiently large and increasing. More importantly, I show 
that redistributive outcomes are affected nonuniformly. When diversity combines with 
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broad intergroup income differences, politically dominant and richer identity groups 
selectively cut benefits and access for poorer, minority-heavy groups while keeping their 
own redistributive interests protected. The result is not fewer social services for everyone, 
but a more regressive and exclusionary welfare state that prioritises the social needs of 
better-off identity groups. These findings portray a more nuanced relationship between 
diversity and redistribution than commonly assumed and shed new light on the 
unexplained variation in redistribution among heterogeneous countries, the puzzle with 
which the article started. 
My analysis has broader contributions for the study of identity politics and social 
policy. First, the growing body of work and important insights on ethnic politics and 
individual preferences tell only part of the story. My findings indicate that individual-level 
mechanisms such as social distance, social rivalry and skill differences imply negative policy 
outcomes, but insufficiently so. Individual-level theories, then, should be complemented by 
macro-level research of actual policy outcomes, the types of available policy tools that can 
promote them and the conflicting interests that each serves or undermines. 
 
Second, as we turn to consider social policy outcomes, my analysis emphasises the 
often-overlooked variation between different types of social policies. Redistributive 
outcomes are typically analysed aggregately, yet different social policies differ significantly 
in their underlying goals, target audiences, inclusiveness and implementation. My findings 
thus point at the importance of additional research on policy design and concrete 
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instruments by which social groups may be differentiated in resource distribution. 
Furthermore, this avenue of research can shift the theoretical discussion from commonly 
discussed problems of collective action and solidarity to more nuanced frameworks of 
competing group interests and unequal allocation of political power. 
 
 
Third, longstanding cleavage structures are important for the rapidly growing 
debate on recent immigration and its influence on social policy. My analysis implies that 
identity politics did not begin with current migrant inflows but have long influenced 
redistributive patterns. As such, it is fair to assume that recent changes in the ascriptive 
makeup of developed democracies build upon previous intergroup dynamics and policy 
equilibria. More attention should thus be given to the interaction of new and old identity 
divisions, intergroup coalitions and rivalries, and intergroup power balance. Heterogeneous 
countries whose social policies are already shaped in light of old ascriptive tensions may 
deal differently with incoming immigration compared to more homogeneous welfare 
states, and, moreover, new immigrants may alter the mutual affinities and interests of old 
ascriptive identity groups. Recent immigration, in other words, is the most recent 
development in the ongoing dynamics of identity politics in the developed world. 
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Appendix 
[INSERT TABLE A1 HERE] 
Notes 
 
1. The Ascriptive Identity Fractionalisation (AIF) index integrates multiple data sources 
and identity dimensions, including ethnicity, religion and language. I elaborate upon 
its operationalisation in later sections. 
2. For simplicity, I assume that re-election-seeking politicians always promote the 
interests of identity groups within their electoral coalitions. In the discussion that 
follows, therefore, I refer directly to identity groups as the key political actors. 
3. Empirically, it is hard to find many current instances of small but dominant minorities 
in contemporary developed democracies. Examples of privileged minorities in 
developing regions, typically the result of colonial legacies, do indicate strong 
protection of their economic interests (e.g., whites in South Africa, ethnic Russians in 
former Soviet republics, or ethnic Chinese in various Southeast Asian countries). 
4. The LIS data do not include Japan, New Zealand and Portugal. In addition, the LIS 
data are not annual and spaced unequally over time by country. When analysing 
these data, I therefore follow Persson et al. (2007) and Lupu and Pontusson (2011) 
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in averaging the values of annual independent variables for the period between 
every two country observations. 
5. My disaggregation leaves out several components that are theoretically irrelevant on 
their own. In the OECD expenditure data, I exclude the ‘other’ category, since, as the 
name implies, its content varies by country. In the LIS data, I exclude military service 
and veteran transfers. 
6. There is no LIS data on public healthcare, which largely involves public services 
rather than direct cash transfers that affect individual income. 
7. The CWED2 data do not include Israel. 
8. The index is calculated as   ∑   
  
    , where pi is the relative share of group i in 
the general population and G is the total number of groups. Substantively, the index 
reflects the odds that two randomly selected members of a given society belong to 
different groups. 
9. Most indices count race under ethnicity, so it is not included separately. Although 
they rely on different primary sources, the different indices correlate strongly along 
their respective identity dimensions. 
10. There are, of course, growing immigration inflows to Western democracies in recent 
years. However, this should not destabilise the AIF scores significantly during my 
sample period. First, immigrant populations arriving by the mid-2000s are included 
in my data. Second, later immigration is relatively gradual: with few exceptions, 
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annual immigration inflow rates leading to 2011 are less than 1 per cent of the host 
population. Indeed, the bivariate correlation between the AIF index and foreign-born 
population shares in 2011, according to OECD data, is relatively high (r = 0.66, p < 
0.005). Third, newer immigrants are not absorbed immediately into the cleavage 
structure and the political system, and should thus influence policy making quite 
slowly. Nevertheless, I reran all my models with an additional control for annual 
immigration inflows as a share of the population using OECD data. Despite a smaller 
sample size, my findings remain robust. 
11. Selway (2011) counts linguistic groups under ethnicity. Additionally, Greece has no 
data on ethnicity/income cross-cuttingness, but I nonetheless keep it in the sample 
using only its religion/income cross-cuttingness score. Ethnicity plays only a minor 
role in Greece: its combined ethnic fractionalisation score is 0.076 compared to a 
sample mean of 0.22. As a robustness check, I omitted Greece from all my models 
and found substantively unchanged results. 
12. This premise does not imply that ascriptive identities and class are ossified 
indefinitely, only that socioeconomic structures change very slowly, if at all, due to 
prolonged processes involving investment in human capital, education and 
infrastructure. Furthermore, intergroup perceptions and stigmas – a central 
mechanism behind group preferences – change even slower. 
13. To test for exogeneity, I reran my models with an alternative measure of group 
inequality instead of cleavage reinforcement and found substantively similar results. 
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This test is elaborated upon later in this article and in the Online Appendix. To test 
for stability over time, I analysed the cleavage reinforcement scores in 97 
comparable surveys conducted by the same data-collecting project, in the same 
country, using the same question wording, but in different years. I then calculated 
the annual difference rate between all comparable survey dyads. The results rule out 
the existence of a consistent pattern of temporal change in the relationship between 
identity and income. This procedure is explained in detail in the Online Appendix. 
41.  Lagrange multiplier tests indicate that the ECM structure decreases, but not 
eliminates, serial autocorrelation when estimating annual spending data. To solve 
this problem, I add the lagged first difference of the dependent variable (∆Ri,t−1) 
and of its denominator (∆GDPi,t−1). The first difference of the dependent variable 
(but not of GDP) is also added when estimating unemployment coverage, 
diagnosed with a similar problem. This fix eliminates the remaining serial 
autocorrelation. 
15. As a robustness check, I reran my models with the alternative bin-estimator 
approach for interactions suggested by Hainmueller et al. (2016). Where their code 
executes, their procedure supports my findings. Additional details are reported in 
the Online Appendix. 
41.  These surveys do not include all relevant countries: the European Social Survey, as 
implied by its name, includes only the European countries from my sample (with the 
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addition of Israel); the relevant module of the International Social Survey 
Programme does not include Canada, Greece, Ireland and the Netherlands.  
17. Age is measured using six age groups; Sex is measured using a dummy variable 
indicating whether respondents are female; Education is measured as respondents’ 
highest level of education; Religiously [AQ1] is measured as frequency of attendance 
in religious services; and Skill level is measured using ISCO’s four skill levels based on 
respondents’ ISCO-08 occupation classification.  
18. To verify that this null result is not an artifact of my AIF measure, I reran models 1 
and 3 using Alesina and Glaeser’s (2004) original ethnic, linguistic and religious 
fractionalisation measures. None of their indices produce a statistically significance 
result. 
19. Models 16–19 include union density as an additional control variable (collinearity 
with central wage bargaining is ruled out) since some countries employ a Ghent 
system, where social security services are distributed by labour unions rather than 
a state agency. Therefore, union membership is expected to have a direct 
mechanical effect on labour market coverage. Central wage bargaining is preferred 
elsewhere due to better data availability. As a robustness check, I reran all other 
models with union density instead of central wage bargaining and found 
substantively unchanged results despite a smaller sample. 
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20. I use the median values in 1997, the first year in the panel in which I have a balanced 
sample for all variables. My nine time-varying covariates produce 18 subsamples for 
the subsequent estimations.  
21. I use scores from the earliest available year (i.e., 1992) based on data from Geo-
referencing of Ethnic Groups (https://icr.ethz.ch/data/greg/). 
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Table 1. The interactive effect of diversity and income reinforcement on intergroup relations 
 (1) (2) 
 Positive contact Interclass accord 
Country-level   
AIF 7.737
*** 
(2.145) 2.811
* 
(1.485) 
Reinforcement 27.944
*** 
(7.693) 12.766
** 
(5.128) 
AIF * Reinforcement –70.572
*** 
(18.049) –27.665
** 
(12.601) 
   
Individual-level   
Age group –0.055
*** 
(0.009) 0.013
** 
(0.007) 
Female 0.045 (0.032) –0.089
*** 
(0.014) 
Education 0.064
*** 
(0.020) 0.044
*** 
(0.007) 
Religiosity –0.035 (0.027) –0.007
** 
(0.003) 
Skill level 0.110
*** 
(0.020) 0.038
*** 
(0.009) 
   
Constant 3.697
*** 
(0.849) 1.508
*** 
(0.568) 
Random intercept variance (country) 0.048
*** 
(0.019) 0.023
*** 
(0.009) 
Residual variance 3.507
*** 
(0.158) 0.426
*** 
(0.009) 
   
Observations 23,561 16,931 
Countries 15 17 
AIC 97,131 33,306 
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01, standard errors in parentheses.  
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Table 2. The interactive effect of diversity and income reinforcement on social spending and 
on inequality reduction 
  Overall spending Inequality reduction 
 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Coefficien
t 
PCSE Coefficien
t 
PCSE Coefficien
t 
PCSE Coefficien
t 
PCSE 
Explanatory variables 
AIF –0.241 (0.214
) 
4.389
***
 (1.144) –0.062 (0.045
) 
0.389
***
 (0.126
) 
Reinforcement   18.495
***
 (4.712)   1.158
**
 (0.567
) 
AIF * 
Reinforcement 
  –45.767
***
 (11.898
) 
  –4.066
***
 (1.339
) 
Veto 0.001 (0.018
) 
-0.001 (0.018) –0.001 (0.004
) 
–0.003 (0.004
) 
         
Short-term relationship 
ΔLeft 0.001 (0.001
) 
0.000 (0.001) –0.000 (0.000
) 
–0.000 (0.000
) 
ΔChristDem 0.008
**
 (0.004
) 
0.009
**
 (0.004) 0.001
***
 (0.000
) 
0.001
***
 (0.000
) 
ΔCWB 0.032 (0.050
) 
0.025 (0.050) 0.006 (0.008
) 
0.006 (0.008
) 
ΔUnemploymen
t 
0.135
***
 (0.037
) 
0.127
***
 (0.037) 0.004
**
 (0.002
) 
0.005
***
 (0.002
) 
ΔLabForce –0.167
***
 (0.042
) 
–0.175
***
 (0.042) –0.004 (0.005
) 
–0.004 (0.004
) 
ΔFemLabForce 0.329
***
 (0.089
) 
0.309
***
 (0.087) 0.010 (0.010
) 
0.008 (0.010
) 
ΔPop65 0.188 (0.202
) 
0.443
**
 (0.218) 0.029
***
 (0.011
) 
0.033
***
 (0.012
) 
ΔLogTrade –1.728
***
 (0.558 –1.615
***
 (0.547) 0.043 (0.067 0.027 (0.062
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) ) ) 
ΔLogGDP –17.400
***
 (2.013
) 
–17.854
***
 (1.983) 0.041 (0.092
) 
0.019 (0.089
) 
        
Long-term relationship 
Leftt-1 0.000 (0.001
) 
0.000 (0.001) 0.000 (0.000
) 
0.000 (0.000
) 
ChristDemt-1 0.001 (0.001
) 
0.003
**
 (0.001) 0.001
***
 (0.000
) 
0.001
***
 (0.000
) 
CWBt-1 0.052
*
 (0.029
) 
0.045 (0.029) 0.007 (0.007
) 
0.007 (0.007
) 
Unemploymentt-
1 
–0.011 (0.010
) 
–0.024
**
 (0.011) 0.002 (0.002
) 
0.002 (0.002
) 
LabForcet-1 –0.004 (0.007
) 
–0.015
*
 (0.008) 0.001 (0.001
) 
0.001 (0.001
) 
FemLabForcet-1 0.026
***
 (0.010
) 
0.031
***
 (0.010) 0.008
**
 (0.004
) 
0.008
**
 (0.004
) 
Pop65t-1 0.034
**
 (0.016
) 
0.054
***
 (0.017) 0.001 (0.002
) 
–0.001 (0.002
) 
LogTradet-1 –0.012 (0.067
) 
–0.045 (0.066) 0.033
**
 (0.016
) 
0.036
**
 (0.016
) 
LogGDPt-1 –0.099 (0.133
) 
–0.164 (0.131) 0.003 (0.025
) 
0.007 (0.024
) 
 
Error-correction term 
Spendingt-1 –0.038
***
 (0.010
) 
–0.055
***
 (0.011)     
Gini reductiont-1     –0.493
***
 (0.152
) 
–0.509
***
 (0.157
) 
 
Lagged difference 
ΔSpendingt-1 0.172
***
 (0.055 0.157
***
 (0.054)     
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) 
ΔLogGDPt-1 9.078
***
 (1.840
) 
8.075
***
 (1.831)     
         
Constant 0.861 (1.357
) 
0.447 (1.339) –0.465
**
 (0.200
) 
–0.583
***
 (0.191
) 
         
Observations 627 627 88 88 
Countries 22 22 19 19 
R
2
 0.544 0.558 0.487 0.528 
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01, panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 3. The interactive effect of diversity and income reinforcement by programme type 
 Public social spending 
 (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 Age Incapacity Unemployment Assistance Healthcare 
AIF –0.687
**
 0.058 1.252
***
 1.502
***
 1.763
***
 
 (0.333) (0.237) (0.445) (0.370) (0.416) 
Reinforcement –1.343 1.485 5.029
***
 5.875
***
 5.262
***
 
 (1.306) (0.956) (1.785) (1.513) (1.705) 
AIF * Reinforcement 4.395 –1.268 –11.779
***
 –15.208
***
 –15.063
***
 
 (3.062) (2.194) (4.320) (3.625) (3.934) 
      
Observations 627 627 620 627 637 
Countries 22 22 22 22 22 
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R
2
 0.464 0.218 0.476 0.209 0.313 
 Inequality reduction  
 (12) (13) (14) (15)  
 Age Incapacity Unemployment Assistance  
AIF –0.202 –0.053 0.073 0.424
**
  
 (0.150) (0.044) (0.058) (0.179)  
Reinforcement –1.168 0.167 0.196 1.964
***
  
 (0.916) (0.269) (0.197) (0.686)  
AIF * Reinforcement 1.939 0.190 –0.803
*
 –4.971
***
  
 (1.845) (0.492) (0.485) (1.800)  
      
Observations 87 79 80 88  
Countries 19 19 19 19  
R
2
 0.492 0.702 0.572 0.490  
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01, panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. The 
full set of control variables is not reported for ease of presentation. Full estimations are 
detailed in the Online Appendix. 
 
 
 
Table 4. The interactive effect of diversity and income reinforcement on social security 
entitlements 
 Unemployment Sick pay 
 (16) (17) (18) (19) 
 Replacement rate Coverage Replacement rate Coverage 
AIF –0.273
***
 0.199
**
 –0.256
***
 0.235
**
 
 (0.093) (0.084) (0.092) (0.099) 
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Reinforcement –0.531
**
 0.501
**
 –0.675
***
 0.757
***
 
 (0.209) (0.207) (0.169) (0.244) 
AIF * Reinforcement 2.475
***
 –1.865
**
 2.302
***
 –2.278
**
 
 (0.815) (0.768) (0.790) (0.935) 
     
Observations 628 556 637 551 
Countries 21 20 21 20 
R
2
 0.098 0.188 0.076 0.193 
Notes: *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01, panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses. The 
full set of control variables, with the addition of union density, is not reported for ease of 
presentation. Complete estimations are detailed in the Online Appendix. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table A1. Control variables for redistribution: Definitions, sources and excepted effect 
Variable Definition Data source Expected sign 
VP Additive veto points index: (1) degree of 
federalism, (2) presence of presidentialism, 
(3) degree of bicameralism, (4) use of 
referenda, (5) degree of proportionality 
and (6) presence of judicial review 
Armingeon et al. 
2016a [AQ8] 
+ 
    
Left The share of cabinet portfolios held by left-
wing parties 
Swank 2013b [AQ9] + 
    
ChristDem The share of cabinet portfolios held by 
Christian-democratic parties 
Swank 2013b + 
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CWB Centralisation of wage bargaining Visser 2015 [AQ10] + 
    
Union density Net union density (models 14–17) Visser 2015 + 
    
Unemployment Unemployment rate as a share of the total 
labour force 
World Economic 
Outlook Database 
+/– 
    
LabForce Civilian labour force participation as a 
share of population aged 15 or above 
OECD Labour 
Statistics 
– 
    
FemLabForce Female participation as a share of the 
civilian labour force 
OECD Labour 
Statistics 
+ 
    
Elderly The share of population aged 65 or above World Development 
Indicators 
+ 
    
LogTrade The log of trade openness (the sum of 
exports and imports of goods and services 
as a share of GDP) 
World Development 
Indicators 
+/– 
    
LogGDP The log of gross domestic product based 
on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) per 
capita 
World Economic 
Outlook Database 
+/– 
Notes:  
aI code Israel’s values using the same rules as Armingeon et al, as it is missing from the 
original dataset.  
bSince Israel is missing from Swank’s database, I the same coding rules to calculate the 
cabinet portfolio allocation for left parties in Israel using data from the European Journal of 
Political Research Political Data Yearbook. Israel does not have Christian-democratic parties. 
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